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THE SUPREME COURT AND NATIONAL SECURITY*
OSMOND K. FRAENKEL**
Security has, of course, been a constant source of concern through-
out history. War or threat of war has been the chief motivating force
for that concern.
The framers of the Constitution well understood that fear for the
safety of the state might result in tyranny and injustice. In the 17th
Century, England had had a spate of treason trials, many of them
spurred by the notorious informer Titus Oates. In the 18th, John
Wilkes' fight against general warrants had had its echoes in Massa-
chusetts. The speech of James Otis on similar abuses was described by
John Adams as the birth of the "child Independence." And France had
yielded many instances by its use of the infamous lettres de cachet.
No doubt these examples contributed to the insertion into the original
Constitution of the careful definition of treason and of the guaranty of
the writ of habeas corpus, and into the bill of rights of the prohibition
against unreasonable searches and of the guaranty of open trials with
the right to jury, counsel and confrontation, as well as of the guaranty
against self-incrimination.
EARLY HISTORY
But however extensive the framers' experience may have been with
concern for security, they might well be astounded were they to revisit
the country they founded and observe the extent to which that concern
has permeated our life in the past decade. And they might be equally
astounded at seeing that the only effective organ of government which
has occasionally put brakes on the abuses which have accompanied
that concern was the United States Supreme Court. For, in their own
lives, when the Adams administration ruthlessly enforced the Alien
and Sedition laws, the Supreme Court was never called upon to act.
Before that became possible, the genius of Jefferson had provided a
leadership around which people could rally and the good sense of the
community assert itself. The obnoxious laws were allowed to lapse, the
convictions erased by presidential action.
But by the time the next great occasion arose--the Civil War-the
* Based on a lecture given at the University of Washington in April 1958, as ampli-
fied by later decisions.
** Member of the New York Bar. Counsel to the American Civil Liberties Union.
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courts had begun to exercise their function of constitutional interpreta-
tion with its inevitable consequence of judicial review of legislative and
executive action. John Marshall had set the Supreme Court on the
road to voiding such action when unconstitutional, and Roger Taney
had completed the work. Nevertheless, during the war, despite arbi-
trary action taken by President Lincoln, the Court was silent. Taney
grumbled when the military ignored his writs but was powerless to do
more. However, after the war was safely won, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional the trial of a civilian by a military commission which
sat in an area not the scene of military operations. The five-to-four
decision in Ex parte Milligan& is the first landmark in the field of civil
liberties. The pronouncement of Justice Davis remains its cornerstone:
Those great and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise,
when rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek
by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in
peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the world
had taught them that what was done in the past might be attempted in
the future. The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circum-
stances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.
WORLD WA I
No important issue in the field arose until during World War I. Then
Congress passed the Espionage Act, which, among other things, pun-
ished interference with recruiting the armed forces. When this law
was used for the prosecution of various leaders of the Socialist Party
who had made speeches opposing our entry into the war, it was
claimed that such prosecution violated the first amendment. The
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the convictions of Schenck, the
secretary of the party, and others, including its head, Eugene Debs.
It was in the Schenck case2 that Justice Holmes first formulated his
famous "clear and present danger" test. He said:
The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
14 Wall. 2 (1866).
2 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight, and that no court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right.
The application of those decisions to lesser fry evoked objection
from both Holmes and Brandeis. In the Abrams case3 twenty-year
sentences had been imposed on a small group of fanatics who had
issued pamphlets condemning American intervention against the new
Soviet government of Russia. In his dissent Justice Holmes said:
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very
foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the theory of our Con-
stitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year,
if not every day, we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy
based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our
system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to
check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate in-
terference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an
immediate check is required to save the country.
Fear of the Russian Revolution had led various states to pass "crim-
inal syndicalism" laws which prohibited the advocacy of the overthrow
of the Government by force. These were applied to persons active in
the newly organized Communist and Communist Labor parties. And
New York prosecuted Ben Gitlow under a statute originally enacted
after the assassination of President McKinley because of the publica-
tion of an inflammatory "Left Wing Manifesto." The Supreme Court
upheld the conviction and ruled4 that, where a state legislature specifi-
cally punished advocacy, the clear and present danger test had no
application. Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented. And in the
Whitney case5 Justice Brandeis reformulated the test in what, for a
long time, remained its classic statement:
Those who won our independency by revolution were not cowards.
They did not fear political change. They did not exalt order at the
cost of liberty. To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the
3 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
4 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).5 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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power of free and fearless reasoning applied through the processes of
popular government, no danger flowing from speech can be deemed
clear and present, unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so
imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full discus-
sion. If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to
be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
BETWEEN THE WARS
But during the period between the two world wars, the Court struck
down a number of state convictions, because it felt they transcended
the requirements of due process. The extent to which the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment made any of the provisions of the
federal bill of rights applicable to the states had for a long time re-
mained in doubt. As recently as 1922 the Court had said' that nothing
in the fourteenth amendment restricted the states in the area of free-
dom of expression. However, a few years later in the Gitlow case the
Court assumed the contrary. And in Fiske v. Kansas8 the Court re-
versed the conviction of an I.W.W. organizer under a criminal syn-
dicalism law because no evidence had been introduced to show that the
I.W.W. actually advocated violence. In Stromberg v. California9 a
conviction was set aside because a law which prohibited any display of
a red flag as "hostility" to government might punish its display, al-
though the hostility was manifested in perfectly lawful ways.
And in 1937 the court reversed a conviction, in Delonge v. Oregon,0
under a criminal syndicalism law based on a speech made under Com-
munist auspices where there was no proof that anything unlawful had
been advocated. Chief Justice Hughes said:
The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from in-
citements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence,
the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional
rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain
the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired,
may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the
Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.
The next action by the court in this area was prompted by the
South's fear of the Negro rather than a fear of ordinary social revolu-
6 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
7Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
8 Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
9 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
10 Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
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tion. Angelo Herndon, a Communist organizer working in Georgia,
had, during the depression, distributed literature which, it was charged,
advocated the violent overthrow of the Government. He was con-
victed under an old state law aimed at "insurrection" of Negroes and
unused until then. The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote,1 held
the conviction unconstitutional, both because the application of the law
interfered with freedom of expression and because it laid down no
sufficient standard of guilt. Justice Roberts concluded that the matter
distributed was not unlawful and that there had been no showing that
Herndon had approved any material that might be considered un-
lawful.
WORLD WAR II
That was the situation when the outbreak of World War II in Europe
created new tensions. The fall of France prompted the enactment both
of a draft law and of the first federal sedition law since the time of
Adams. This last was modeled on the state criminal syndicalism laws
and is known as the Smith Act. It also incorporated the provisions of
the old Espionage Act which related to causing insubordination in the
armed forces. Members of the Socialist Workers Party in Minneapolis
were convicted under both aspects of the law. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the conviction, ruling 2 that the
clear and present danger test did not apply. And the Supreme Court
refused to review, though twice asked to reconsider.'
Then came Pearl Harbor with its fear of Japanese invasion of the
West Coast. The army at first imposed a curfew on all persons of
Japanese ancestry, then ordered them evacuated from a large area
along the whole coast and detained those evacuated in camps. The
orders applied to citizens as well as aliens. In the Hirabayashi case'
a challenge to the curfew was rejected. Chief Justice Stone said that
the government had "the power to wage war successfully," that the
military had the right to take what measures they believed were neces-
sary "to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage," and that the
"ethnic affliliations" of those singled out might be a sufficient source of
danger in case of invasion. While the decision was unanimous, Justice
Murphy expressed the view that it went "to the very brink of constitu-
tional power." But he, together with Justices Roberts and Jackson, dis-
it Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
12 Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137 (1943).
13 Dunne v. United States, 320 U.S. 790(1943) ; id. 814 (1943) ; id. 815 (1944).
'4 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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sented when the principle of that case was applied"5 to sustain the
evacuation orders. At the same time that this happened, the Court
unanimously ruled" that a citizen of Japanese ancestry conceded to be
loyal could not be detained in a camp. The question as to the pro-
cedure by which loyalty might be determined if not conceded was
never passed upon. Fortunately, as the war progressed, the fear of
invasion evaporated, and the camps were disbanded. It is worthy of
note that, if Justices Black and Douglas had joined the dissenters in
the evacuation case, the result would have been different.
During the course of the war there were various prosecutions but
nothing like the number which had occurred during World War I. The
Supreme Court reversed 17 the conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses in
Mississippi under a law which punished the distribution of literature
"calculated to encourage disloyalty," because there was no proof that
the defendants had any "evil or sinister purpose." By a five-to-four
vote, 8 the Court reversed an Espionage Act conviction based on the
distribution of pro-Nazi, anti-English, and anti-Roosevelt material,
because there was nothing in the pamphlets or their method of distribu-
tion which justified a finding that the defendant intended to interfere
with the armed forces. And it reversed 9 the conviction of officers of
the German-American Bund for advising members not to register under
the draft law until it had been clarified.
The Court also reversed" convictions of civilians by military courts
in Hawaii during the existence of martial law there on the narrow
ground that Congress had not intended they be so tried. Justice
Murphy alone dealt with broader issues and expressed the opinion that
Congress had no power to permit military trials of civilians so long as
there was no actual invasion and the ordinary criminal courts were
able to function.
And the Court, for the first time in its history, reviewed two convic-
tions for treason. In the first, it reversed,2' because two witnesses had
not been produced to show that the accused had given aid and comfort
to the enemy. In the second, it affirmed2 on the ground that the evi-
dence necessitated the inference that this had been done. Justice
1 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
"I Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
1 Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
18 Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944).
19 Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945).2 0 Duncan v. Kahamanoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
21 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
22 Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
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Douglas dissented from this last holding, as he could see no basis for
reconciling the two decisions.
In the meantime the issue of membership in the Communist party
arose in connection with deportation and denaturalization. The first
case involved Schneiderman, an avowed Communist leader, who had
become a citizen in 1923. The Government produced evidence that the
party advocated forcible overthrow of the Government at that time,
but no proof that Schneiderman had adopted these views as his own.
A majority of the Court concluded 3 that citizenship could not be lost
on such a state of facts, particularly since, at least in 1923, there was
room for doubt about what the Communist party did advocate. But in
the Bridges deportation case the Court merely held24 that the depart-
mental hearing had not been fair. Justice Murphy alone discussed the
basic issues.
THE COLD WAR
Such was the posture of the law when the "cold war" started a whole
new series of decisions. It will be more convenient to discuss these
under certain categories rather than chronologically. Three main areas
have been charted: 1) cases dealing with exposure, which have arisen
primarily in connection with legislative investigations and registration
requirements; 2) cases dealing with prevention, which have arisen most
often in connection with loyalty programs and oaths; and 3) cases
dealing with punishment, which includes criminal prosecutions and
penalties such as deportation.
Exposure. Ever since the days of Martin Dies, the Un-American
Activities Committee of the House of Representatives has been engaged
in the business of bringing to public notice possible Communist affilia-
tions of a great variety of people-in addition to sniping at many per-
sons against whom some of its members had grievances, as with the
attack on Governor (later Justice) Murphy of Michigan because of the
enlightened position he took in dealing with sit-down strikes. Since this
committee contented itself for a long time with questioning willing
witnesses, no test of its powers developed until 1948. Then the courts
of appeals for the Second Circuit and for the District of Columbia up-
held them, though with eloquent dissents, and the Supreme Court re-
fused to review.2" And it likewise denied review26 to the "Hollywood
23 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
24 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945).
2 5 Josephson v. United States, 165 F2d 82, Judge Clark dissenting, cert. den. 333
U.S. 838 (1948) ; Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, Judge Edgerton dissenting,
cert. den. 334 U.S. 843 (1948).
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Ten" who all had refused to answer questions about Communist affilia-
tions on first amendment grounds.
After that, most unwilling witnesses pleaded the privilege against
self-incrimination and escaped jail. It was in one of these cases"7 that
Chief Justice Warren reminded the country of limitations on the power
of Congressional committees:
But the power to investigate, broad as it may be, is also subject to
recognized limitations. It cannot be used to inquire into private
affairs unrelated to a valid legislative purpose. Nor does it extend to
an area in which Congress is forbidden to legislate. Similarly, the
power to investigate must not be confused with any of the powers of
law enforcement; those powers are assigned under our Constitution
to the Executive and the Judiciary. Still further limitations on the
power to investigate are found in the specific individual guarantees of
the Bill of Rights, such as the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination which is in issue here.
Finally, in the Watkins and Sweezy cases, the court actually dealt
with some of the basic constitutional issues. In Watkins"3 the Chief
Justice stressed the breadth and vagueness of the resolution creating
the Un-American Activities Committee. There are many who believe
that the court intended to rule that constitutional restrictions were
violated by this resolution; but the Court did not rest its decision on
his part of its opinion. Rather, it decided that, in the setting of such a
resolution, a witness was entitled clearly to be informed by the com-
mittee of the pertinency of the questions asked him.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has since
ruled that the Watkins decision did not strike down the committee's
power to compel witnesses to answer questions about Communist con-
nections, and the Supreme Court has agreed to review that decision.29
In Sweezy' ° four of the Justices reversed a conviction for refusal to
answer questions put by the attorney general of New Hampshire,
acting under authority from the legislature to investigate subversion,
on the ground that it had not been established that the legislature con-
templated the kind of questions which were asked. These dealt with
the contents of a lecture given at a university and the witness's con-
nection with the Progressive party. Because of the nature of the ques-
tions, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan went further and contended
26"Lawvson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49, cert. den. 339 U.S. 934 (1950).
27 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).28 Watldns v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).29 Barenblatt v. United States, 356 U.S. 929 (1958).
30 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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that first amendment freedoms were involved. Justice Frankfurter
said:
In the political realm, as in the academic, thought and action are
presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority. It can-
not require argument that inquiry would be barred to ascertain
whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of the two major
parties either in a state or national election. Until recently, no differ-
ence would have been entertained in regard to inquiries about a voter's
affiliations with one of the various so-called third parties that have had
their day, or longer, in our political history.
But the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in a similar case, has
refused to follow the United States Supreme Court, and that Court has
agreed to hear argument." Further light on this subject will thus be
forthcoming at the current Term of the Court.
Registration requirements have, thus far, produced no authoritative
decision. The Supreme Court avoided consideration of any of the con-
stitutional issues involved in the Subversive Activities Control Act by
remanding the case involving the Communist Party82 to the Subversive
Activities Control Board for reconsideration of claims that its findings
had rested on the perjured testimony of various informers. After the
Board confirmed its earlier finding, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia sent the case back for further consideration, because
the Government had refused to produce statements made by its wit-
nesses.
3
Prevention. The first test in this area grew out of the Taft-Hartley
Act requirement that officers of labor unions which sought the aid of
the Labor Board file affidavits that they were not members of the
Communist party and did not believe in violent revolution. Only
Justice Black dissented from the holding that the "non-Communist"
part of the oath was valid (Justice Douglas had not participated). But
the Court divided evenly with respect to the "belief" part." And that
issue has not since arisen.
Various states and municipalities have imposed oath requirements.
The first case to reach the Supreme Court involved Maryland's law,
which exacted an oath from candidates for public office. The Supreme
Court unanimously upheld this oath on the assurance by the state
31 Uphaus v. Wyman, 356 U.S. 926 (1958).
32 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
83 S.A.C.B. v. Communist Party, 254 F2d 314 (1958).
84 American Communist Assn v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382; Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S.
846 (1950).
35 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
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attorney general that it required only a statement that the candidate
was not engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force
and was not knowingly a member of an organization so engaged. Thus,
no question of belief or even advocacy was involved.
On the basis of that decision, a majority of the Court upheld"' an
ordinance of Los Angeles which required every municipal employee to
swear that he had not advocated the violent overthrow of the Govern-
ment during the previous five years and had not belonged to any
organization which did. Justice Frankfurter thought the oath bad,
because it did not specifically require that the membership had been
with knowledge of the character of the organization-knowledge the
majority had implied into the law. Justice Burton dissented because
of the five-year period, which left no escape when there had been a
change of heart. Justices Black and Douglas also criticized the oath
because of its retroactive application.
But the court unanimously struck down37 an Oklahoma statute,
because it required dismissal of employees regardless of their knowl-
edge of the character of the organization.
The basic issues involved in the disqualification of public employees
because of membership in proscribed organizations was given fuller
consideration in the case involving New York's Feinberg Law. That
statute set up machinery for listing such organizations and for periodic
checks on all school employees. Employees dismissed for knowing
membership were entitled to judicial review. The majority held" that
any impact on freedom of association or expression resulted from the
teacher's choice and was, therefore, not protected. Justices Black and
Douglas dissented. Justice Douglas pointed out the threat to freedom
implicit in the annual checkup required by the law and the trend to
orthodoxy which would result.
The Slochower case39 illustrates another aspect of this problem. New
York City, by charter provision, declares forfeit the position of any
employee who, when asked about the affairs of the city or the duties of
his position, refuses to answer by claiming his privilege against self-
incrimination. The Board of Higher Education of the City of New
York dismissed a number of professors and other employees who had
pleaded their privilege before the Senate Subcommittee on Internal
Security when questioned about Communist connections. This, said
36 Garner v. Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
37 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
38 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
39 Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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the Supreme Court, was improper because the dismissal was automatic
and took no account of circumstances. The court stressed the fact that
the Senate subcommittee had disclaimed any intention to inquire into
matters affecting New York City. Justices Reed, Burton, Minton, and
Harlan dissented.
But on the last day of the 1957 Term the Court, in two 5-4 decisions,
narrowed the scope of Slockower." It upheld the dismissals of a
teacher and a subway motorman on the ground that the dismissals
rested on failure to answer questions put by the supervisory authority.
The dissenters (the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and
Brennan) believed the dismissals bad because based on improper infer-
ences of disloyalty. Justices Black and Douglas alone said the ques-
tioning had been improper.
The loyalty program instituted by President Truman in 1947 has
not yet been passed upon by the Supreme Court, although the Court
has decided a number of cases which arose under it. The first was a
challenge to the power of the Attorney General to list organizations as
subversive. It resulted in a decision that organizations listed without
hearings (as originally was the practice) had the right to judicial
review to determine whether the Attorney General had acted arbi-
trarily" An attempt by the National Lawyers Guild to obtain a judi-
cial ruling with respect to the power of the Attorney General failed,
because the lower courts held it had first to go through the administra-
tive hearing procedure established by the Attorney General after the
earlier decision, and the Supreme Court refused to review.,2
Several cases involving dismissed federal employees have reached the
Supreme Court. In the first, by a four-to-vote, the Court avoided43
expressing an opinion with regard to the power to dismiss a person in a
non-sensitive position on the basis of unsworn statements from anony-
mous informants. In the second, the Court held" that the Loyalty
Review Board had no power to pass on the case of an employee who
had been cleared by his departmental board. This ruling was applied45
to a case where the Secretary of State had overruled clearance given by
a subordinate.
And in Cole v. Young 6 the Court held that a statute which permitted
40 Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958).
41 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
42 National Lawyers Guild v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 552, cert. den. 351 U.S. 927 (1956).
"1 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
"4 Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
4r Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363 (1957).
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summary dismissal in the interest of national security applied only to
sensitive positions. The Court gave no indication on what basis, or by
whom, it was to be determined which positions were sensitive. That
decision has not affected the loyalty program as much as was expected,
since loyalty is one of the factors which the Civil Service Commission
considers in determining suitability for all positions. However, legis-
lation has been introduced in Congress in an endeavor to undo the
decision altogether.
The army has conducted a loyalty program of its own. Two aspects
of it have reached the Supreme Court. Ordinarily, above-age doctors
who were drafted were given commissions, but that was not done when
there was doubt about loyalty. A commission was refused a doctor
who had claimed his privilege against self-incrimination when asked to
disclose organizational affiliations. The Court upheld"7 this action over
dissents by Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas.
In the case of privates it was the practice of the army to drop per-
sons suspected of being disloyal from service with discharges less than
honorable. Attempts to correct this practice were met with the conten-
tion, sustained by many lower courts, that such discharges were not
subject to judicial scrutiny. When, finally, the Supreme Court heard
argument on two of these cases, the Solicitor General persisted in that
position, despite his frank admission that it was beyond the power of
the army to determine the character of the discharge by reference to
pre-induction activities alone. That was too much for the Court, which,
over the sole dissent of Justice Clark, reversed. 8
The State Department has inaugurated a loyalty program in con-
nection with passports. For a long time it had insisted on its right to
issue or revoke passports without judicial interference. But in a case
sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union 9 a three-judge court
in the District of Columbia recognized that there was a constitutional
right to a passport and held that a passport could not be revoked
arbitrarily. Then the Department set up procedures in cases involving
possible Communist affiliations which provided for hearings but left it
open for the Secretary to act on undisclosed information. Later, it
imposed on all applicants the obligation to disclose under oath the
facts with reference to past or present membership in the Communist
party.
46 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
47 Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
48 Harmon v. Bruckner, 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
49 Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (1952).
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In 1958 the court"0 held that the Secretary of State had no power,
under existing legislation, to deny passports to persons because of
possible Communist affiliations. It therefore passed on no constitu-
tional issues. Justices Burton, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker dissented.
An attempt to override this decision failed in Congress.
Two cases involving admission to the bar belong in this category as
much as anywhere else. In each, admission had been denied for alleged
lack of good moral character. In the Sclware case"' New Mexico had
rejected the applicant, despite excellent recommendations, because he
had at one time been a member of the Communist party. The Court
unanimously held this improper. In the Konigsberg case 52 California
had rejected the applicant, also highly recommended, because he had
refused to answer questions about Communist affiliations. This time
the Court divided. The majority held that such refusal did not evidence
bad character; the minority, Justices Clark and Harlan, felt that re-
fusal to answer pertinent questions justified denial of admission. Justice
Frankfurter also dissented, but on the ground-also agreed with by the
other dissenters-that the constitutional issue had not been properly
raised in the state court.
The Supreme Court remanded a third case," that of Patterson from
Oregon, on the basis of these two decisions. But when the state court
held that these cases did not control because here there had been a
finding that the applicant had falsely denied that the Communist party
advocated the violent overthrow of the government, the Supreme Court
declined to review."
Punishment. The 1940 Smith Act (now 18 U.S.C. 2385) is the chief
basis for the Government's criminal prosecutions in the field of secu-
rity. Its constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court when it
reviewed the 1949 conviction of the leaders of the Communist party in
Dennis v. United States." Six of the justices (Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Reed, Minton, and Burton of the majority and Justices
Black and Douglas, who dissented) concluded that the "clear and
present danger" test applied, despite the fact that the statute punished
advocacy, thus to that extent overruling the Gitlow case." But they
differed both in their interpretation of that test and the functions of
&0 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116; Dayton v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958).
51 Schware v. Board of Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).&2 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
53 In re Patterson, 353 U.S. 952 (1957).
64 I re Patterson, 356 U.S. 947 (1958).
65 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
rG Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
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judge and jury in applying it. The four justices of the majority ap-
proved the reformulation of the test which had been made by Judge
Learned Hand in the Court of Appeals. Chief justice Vinson said:
Chief judge Learned Hand, writing for the majority below, inter-
preted the phrase as follows: "In each case [courts] must ask whether
the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 183 F.2d
at 212. We adopt this statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief
judge Hand, it is as succinct and inclusive as any other we might
devise at this time. It takes into consideration those facts which we
deem relevant, and relates their significance. More we cannot expect
from words.
The dissenters objected to the injection of the concept of probability
and insisted that the prohibition of the first amendment was absolute
"except in the extreme case of peril from the speech itself." The dis-
senters further objected to the majority's ruling that the issue of danger
should be resolved by the judge, not the jury. They also dissented
from the finding that there was a sufficient danger from the Communist
party. Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, while agreeing that the con-
victions should be affirmed, believed, though for different reasons, that
the "clear and present danger" test was not applicable.
For a number of years thereafter, the Supreme Court refused to
review other Smith Act convictions, including those of the second-
string leadership. But in 1957 it reversed57 the convictions of the two
California leaders of the party. That case raised a number of issues.
All the justices except Justices Clark and Burton (but justices Bren-
nan and Whittaker did not participate at all) held that the part of the
statute which punished the "organization" of a proscribed group re-
lated only to its original formation. Legislation has been introduced to
change this. All the justices except Justice Clark agreed that the evi-
dence with respect to five of the defendants was wholly insufficient, so
that they were entitled to a dismissal of the indictment and that the
trial court's charge had not made clear the difference between incite-
ment to illegal action and mere discussion of it. But Justices Black and
Douglas thought that the nine defendants given a new trial by this
decision also should have been set free, partly because the law was un-
constitutional, partly because the only overt acts charged were legal,
partly because as to them the evidence was likewise insufficient. And
they disagreed with a formulation of instructions to the jury which the
majority approved.
57 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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The Government then announced that it would not proceed with the
new trial of the remaining nine. And in many other Smith Act prosecu-
tions around the country new trials were ordered or indictments
dropped. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed"8 the
conviction of a Connecticut group and dismissed the indictment, and
the Supreme Court denied the Government's application for certiorari.
Other prosecutions under the Smith Act involved the membership
clause. No decision has yet been rendered by the Supreme Court on
the extent to which mere membership may be punished. It avoided an
opportunity for so doing by reversing50 two convictions on the ground
that pertinent statements by government witnesses had been withheld
from the defense.
But the Supreme Court held6" that the Smith Act exhausted the
field, so that no state might prosecute the advocacy of the forcible
overthrow of the Government. Justices Reed, Burton, and Minton dis-
sented. Legislation introduced in Congress to permit concurrent state
legislation has failed of passage so far.
The Rosenberg case requires brief mention. In that prosecution for
violating the prohibition contained in the Espionage Act of 1917
against disclosure of secrets in wartime, the two chief defendants were
convicted and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court refused to re-
view their conviction and to grant a later motion to vacate the judg-
ment. 1 Further review was then sought on the very eve of the sched-
uled execution of the Rosenbergs. Pending filing of the formal papers,
an application was made to Justice Jackson on June 12, 1953, for a
stay of execution. He referred the application to the full court, which
declined to hear oral argument and denied the stay on June 15th, the
last day of the 1952 term.62 A further application for habeas corpus
was denied in a "special term" held the same afternoon.63
Later on that day, an application for a stay was filed with Justice
Douglas by new counsel, who, for the first time, attacked the validity
of the death sentence on the ground that the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 had superseded the old law in reference to disclosure of atomic
secrets, the chief charge in the Rosenberg case, and that the death
penalty could be imposed under the 1946 law only on recommendation
of the jury, which had not been given. Justice Douglas granted that
,8 United States v. Silverman, 248 F.2d 671 (1957) ; cert. den. 354 U.S. 942 (1958).
1; Scales v. United States, 354 U.S. 1; Lightfoot v. United States, 354 U.S. 2 (1957).
60 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
61 Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838, 889 (1952), 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
62345 U.S. 989.
63 346 U.S. 271.
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application on June 17th, so that the new question, which he felt was
a substantial one, could be decided by the lower courts. 4 Thereupon,
the Attorney General requested Chief Justice Vinson to recall the Court
to hear argument with respect to the stay. Over the protest of Justice
Black, that was done. Extended argument took place on Thursday,
June 18th. On the next day, Friday the 19th, the Court announced its
decision vacating the stay on the ground that the question was not
substantial."
The chief point raised in the various majority opinions was that the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was not in force at the time the acts
charged took place in 1944 and 1945 and that by its express terms the
later law did not purport to supersede existing laws. Justice Black
objected to the "unprecedented" action of calling the Court in session
during vacation to pass on a stay granted by one of the justices. And
he, as well as Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, believed there was
such substance to the argument presented that it should not have been
disposed of until after ample time for consideration. The Rosenbergs
were executed on the day the final decision was rendered.
In the field of deportation the Court has followed the old rule that
this does not constitute punishment, but not without protest from
Justices Black and Douglas. On that basis it has continued to hold"0
that the ex post facto prohibition was not applicable. And it sustained"7
legislation which made all former members of the proscribed organiza-
tions deportable and also upheld a later law which specifically made
deportable all past or present members of the Communist party."3 But
in 1957 the Court held,69 over dissent by Justices Burton, Clark, Har-
lan, and Whittaker, that deportation of a former party member was
justified only where there had been "meaningful" membership. And
the Court also held that the Attorney General had no power to require
deportable aliens whom no country would take, to advise him about
possible Communist activities," nor to restrict their actions. Here
also legislation has been introduced to change the law.
California's law denying tax exemption to persons and organizations
advocating the overthrow of the Government by force was perhaps
64 346 U.S. 271, at 313.
0r 346 U.S. 271, at 288.
68 Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957).
67 Harisiades v. Shaugnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
8 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
69 Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
7 0 United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194 (1957).
71 Barton v. Sentner, 353 U.S. 963 (1957).
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motivated by all three of the considerations already discussed. At
least it does not clearly fit under any one of them. So it can best be
treated here. It was declared unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court" over the sole dissent of Justice Clark on the ground
that it improperly cast the burden of proof on the taxpayer. Justices
Black and Douglas reiterated their view that all such laws are uncon-
stitutional on broad first amendment grounds.
Some Odds and Ends. Security considerations also occasionally
creep into cases that do not by themselves involve security. Thus, in
the ordinary criminal prosecution the Government may refuse to
divulge information which it believes essential to national security.
In 1953 the Supreme Court had held73 that a federal conviction must
be reversed when the defendant was not allowed to examine, and place
before the jury, statements made by a crucial prosecution witness
which were inconsistent with his trial testimony.
That rule was amplified in the much discussed Jencks case." There
the Court, over the sole dissent of Justice Clark, held that the defense
was entitled to see such statements even if it could not establish that
they were inconsistent with the trial testimony and that if the Govern-
ment wanted to withhold the statements for security reasons it must
drop the prosecution. Congress immediately passed a law" which
somewhat restricts the effect of the decision. The new law provides
that the trial judge need let the defense see only such parts of the
statement as are relevant to the issues and also lets him expunge the
testimony of the witness involved instead of requiring the case to be
dropped. Even more restrictive legislation has been proposed.
The same principle was applied7 1 to the prosecution's refusal to
reveal the identity of an informer, because the Court believed that the
refusal was prejudicial in the particular case. Again Justice Clark was
the only dissenter.
Some Conclusions. The foregoing review shows a growing concern
in the Supreme Court over the many restrictions on liberty resulting
from the tensions of war and fear of war. Its record during and after
World War II, despite the unfortunate decision upholding the evacua-
tion from the West Coast, was vastly better than the one established
during and after World War I. This is due, in part, to the new approach
72 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513; First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357
U.S. 545 (1958).
73 Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953).74 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
75 71 STAT. 595 (1957), 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. V, 1958).
76 Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
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to civil liberties problems reached after the depression under the lead-
ership of Chief Justice Hughes.
Changes in the composition of the Court have, of course, greatly in-
fluenced the results in many situations. For a time (from 1943 to 1949)
there was a group of four justices-Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rut-
ledge-who could almost always be counted on to decide in favor of
liberty. That balance shifted after the death of the last two of these
under the influence of Chief Justice Vinson and the three other ap-
pointees of President Truman-Burton, Clark and Minton. While the
pendulum has swung again under the leadership of Chief Justice War-
ren, with the help of Justice Brennan, yet the majority was pro-liberty
in only seven of the eighteen civil liberties cases7" decided at the cur-
rent Term by a vote of five to four: Justice Whittaker joined the Chief
Justice and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan three times, Justice
Frankfurter did so twice, and Justices Clark and Burton each once.
Justice Brennan joined the Chief Justice and Justices Black and
Douglas nine times in dissents from unfavorable decisions; once Justice
Whittaker did so. In one case the dissenters were Justices Frankfur-
ter, Douglas, Harlan, and Brennan. There were also seven cases in
which the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas dissented
alone and one case in which the dissenters were Justices Frankfurter,
Douglas, and Brennan.
In all humility, perhaps a word of caution should be added to the
characterization of a "favorable" decision. By that is meant one
which upholds the asserted claim of violation of some civil liberty.
But there has been such a wide extension of that area in the past
decades that it is inevitable that extreme claims should be asserted
which often find no support from any of the justices, or at the most
from one or two. Therefore a denial of the claim does not necessarily
mean a decision "unfavorable" to civil liberties. Some discrimination
must be exercised in judging the Court in the light of statistics based
only on the results of the cases.
In appraising the record of the Court, two opposite points of view
have been expressed. There are those who are disturbed because the
Court has continued its traditional practice of avoiding decision of
constitutional issues whenever possible. That policy is, of course, frus-
trating to those of us who are more concerned with general principles
77 There were two cases in which Justice Brennan did not participate and, judging
by his other decisions, would have joined the Chief Justice and Justices Black and
Douglas in dissent had he participated.
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than particular instances. In consequence much damage is often done
to our way of life by legislative or executive action before the Court
gets around to passing on its constitutionality. Thus, the challenge to
the charter of the Un-American Activities Committee has been await-
ing adjudication for upwards of ten years. But this is one of the facts
of judicial life to which we must adjust ourselves.
On the other hand, others are disturbed because the Court has
been "soft" on Communists. Before they make such a judgment they
should consider the impact of the decisions, less in the light of the
individual affected, more in the light of the effect on the whole com-
munity of the restrictions on liberty which the Court has struck
down. For there is no doubt that the harm of these restrictions has
been incalculable. Countless young people have hesitated to join
organizations, have rejected careers exposed to inquiry, have suc-
cumbed to the deadening level of conformity. Fortunately the Court
has not been blind to these considerations.
It was inevitable, however, that the notable advances recently made
by the Court should, as has here been already noted several times,
have produced hostile reactions in many quarters. While no single
security decision has aroused the storm which, throughout the South,
greeted the school segregation decisions,"8 Congressman Walter and
Senator Jenner have introduced legislation which, if enacted, would
render many of the decisions discussed here nugatory in the future or
prevent the Supreme Court from exercising jurisdiction in most of
the pertinent areas. Fortunately, none of the legislation has thus
far been enacted.
But in considering the merits of any of these proposals we must not
react merely because it is a decision of the Supreme Court which
Congress seeks to overcome. Insofar as the decision rested upon
the Court's interpretation of a statute, it is appropriate for Congress
to say that it wants the law to be different. After all, the responsibility
for legislating is vested by the Constitution in the elected representa-
tives, not in the appointed Court. The pending legislation should be
scrutinized, therefore, entirely on the merits of each of its component
parts, unhampered by any emotional reaction that it seeks to undo a
Supreme Court decision. So judged, most, if not all, the proposals
are bad. But that is another subject that cannot adequately be dealt
with here.
However, insofar as the Court rested any of its decisions on con-
78 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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stitutional grounds, Congress has no power to interfere. Assuredly, it
should not accomplish by the backdoor of denying jurisdiction to the
Court what it could not accomplish directly by legislation. That was
once done to avoid scrutiny of the post-Civil War reconstruction legis-
lation, and the Supreme Court acquiesced. 9 Since then, no attempt
has been made to withdraw all jurisdiction in a particular area, but
in sustaining more limited restrictions on the Supreme Court's power
to review very broad language was used with respect to congressional
power. 0 Whether the present Court would adhere to these views is
doubtful. However, it would be most unwise for Congress to enact any
such legislation. It would give the forty-eight states and the eleven
federal courts of appeals final jurisdiction with the probable result
of divergent views on the meaning of the Constitution-veritable
chaos.
One other aspect of congressional resentment at the Court is worthy
of note. A nominee for a federal district court judgeship, on March
26, 1958, at the request of Senator Eastland, pledged that if con-
firmed he would not "participate knowingly in any decision to alter
the meaning of the Constitution itself or of any law as passed by the
Congress and adopted under the Constitution."81 It is reported that
the pledge was suggested by Senator O'Mahony to head off the Jenner
bill. Let us hope that no nominee for the Supreme Court will ever
agree to such a pledge. Either it will be interpreted as restricting his
freedom in interpretation of statutes and the Constitution, or it is
meaningless. All that can properly be asked of any person aspiring
to high judicial office is that he subscribe to an oath to support and
defend the Constitution. How he shall do this is for each justice to
decide in the light of the best available information and according to
his conscience. Fortunately, we have now on the Court men of vision,
independence, and courage. Nowhere has this been more manifest
than in the area of this discussion, national security.
This has been exemplified most fully, perhaps, by one of the great
justices of our time, William 0. Douglas, and well-expressed in the
foreword to his most recent book, The Right of the People:
This is the time for us to become the champions of the virtues that
have given the West great civilizations. These virtues are reflected in
our attitudes and ways of thought, not in our standard of living. They
79 Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 318 (1868), 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
80 See The Frances Wright, 105 U.S. 381, 386 (1882) ; Stephan v. United States,
319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943).
81 See New York Times, March 27, 1958, p. 17, col. 1.
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are found in the ideas of justice, liberty, and equality that are written
into the American Constitution. They concern the rights of the people
against the state. These rights include the right to speak and write as
one chooses, the right to follow the dictates of one's conscience, the
right to worship as one desires. They include the right to be let alone
in a myriad of ways, including the right to defy government at times
and tell it not to intermeddle. These rights of the people also include
the right to manage the affairs of the nation-civil and military-and
to be free of military domination or direction.
These are the rights that distinguish us from all totalitarian regimes.
The real enemies of freedom are not confined to any nation or any
country. They are everywhere. They flourish where injustice, dis-
crimination, ignorance, superstition, intolerance, and arbitrary power
exist. We cannot afford to inveigh against them abroad, unless we are
alert to guard against them at home. Yet in recent years as we have
denounced the loss of liberty abroad we have witnessed its decline
here. We have, indeed, been retreating from our democratic ideals at
home. We have compromised them for security reasons.
It is time to put an end to the retreat. It is time we made these
virtues truly positive influences in our policies. We have a moral
authority in our ideals of justice, liberty, and equality that is inde-
structible. If we live by those virtues, we will rejuvenate America. If
we make them our offensive at home and abroad, we will quicken the
hearts of men the world around. The contest is on for the uncommit-
ted people of the earth. These ideals express the one true advantage
we have over communism in that contest.
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